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Abstract 
Global value chains are highly fragmented across countries and dominated by a few large multinational 
firms. But the challenges of an increasingly difficult international business environment are raising the 
question of how these patterns will change. I study the role of international Just-in-Time (JIT) supply 
chains in how global production is organized and what the future may hold. Using survey and 
administrative data for a large panel of French manufacturers, I first document that JIT is widespread 
across all industries and accounts for roughly two thirds of aggregate employment and trade. Next, I 
establish two novel stylized facts about the structure of international JIT supply chains: (1) They are more 
concentrated in space and (2) more vertically integrated than their ‘traditional’ counterparts. I rationalize 
these patterns in a framework of sequential production where failure to coordinate adaptation decisions in 
an uncertain environment leads to inventory holding. In JIT supply chains, information about downstream 
demand conditions is relayed upstream, which facilitates coordination. The associated inventory saving 
effect is stronger when firms are close to each other, so that the supply chain reacts quickly to changes in 
demand. This also applies when they are part of the same company and incentives for adaptation are 
aligned. I validate this model by supporting empirical evidence for further predictions and discuss potential 
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1 Introduction
Today’s Global Value Chains (GVCs) have been shaped by advances in digital technology
and liberalization efforts in goods and asset markets. They also have at least two salient
and important stylized characteristics: they are highly fragmented across countries1 and
a few large multinational business groups not only account for the bulk of activity, but
encompass whole segments of these value chains.2 Both of these aspects have significant
implications for, inter alia, productive efficiency and hence affordable consumption (for
example, Blaum et al., 2018; Antràs, 2015). In recent years, however, the business envi-
ronment for global supply networks has taken a turn for the worse, both in the political
and in the physical sphere. Prominent sources for the rise in (perceived) uncertainty3
and friction to global commerce4 include a surge in protectionism in many countries, a
rapidly changing world order, climate change and, last but not least, pandemic events – in
2020, The New York Times even senses “a moment of reckoning for global supply chains”
(Swanson and Tankersley, 2020). One of the big questions for manufacturing and beyond
is how the structure of GVCs will change, especially with respect to spatial patterns and
multinational production.
The objective of this paper is to study the role of an important feature of modern
production networks, namely, that at least some parts are managed in a lean, highly co-
ordinated, just-in-time (JIT) fashion. Indeed, JIT has potentially important implications
for GVCs: a supply chain’s ability to coordinate tasks is shaped by its geographic set-up
and the control structure in decision making. Moreover, businesses and policy makers
(and occasionally even the general public) regularly voice concerns about the resilience,
robustness and efficiency of highly coordinated JIT production networks. Two recent ex-
amples of this are the discussions around waiting times due to post-Brexit border checks5
and around lock-down effects after the outbreak of COVID-19 (Miroudot, 2020). Despite
these powerful reasons for investigation, so far there is only limited economic research
1The high degree of fragmentation is illustrated by the two facts that (1) more than half of all international
trade involves intermediate goods and that (2) domestic value added has fallen to slightly more than three
quarters of every dollar exported (Miroudot et al., 2009; Johnson and Noguera, 2012).
2For example, the vast majority of U.S. trade transactions involves a multinational company and intrafirm
trade accounts for around a third of all U.S. exports and almost half of imports (Bernard et al., 2009; Ruhl,
2015).
3The Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index developed by Davis (2016) averaged 80 points for the
years 1997-2007, but 152 from 2008 to June 2020. Two recent spikes were related to the Sino-American
conflict and COVID-19 (Altig et al., 2020).
4Using the Global Trade Alert, Evenett (2019) documents a dramatic increase in harmful trade related
policies, including tariffs and non-tariff barriers, since 2009.
5In February 2018, the UK’s Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee stated: “The vol-
ume of manufacturers rely upon the just-in-time delivery system [...] We heard from Honda their esti-
mate that a 15 minute delay could add around 850,000 per year in costs - a significant sum” (available at
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmbeis/379/37902.htm, accessed 21/08/2019).
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on how the demands of coordination interact with the spatial and ownership structure of
GVCs.
Using the example of France, this paper provides the first comprehensive empirical
characterization of international just-in-time manufacturing supply chains. I propose a
novel conceptual framework to rationalize the patterns documented in the data, validate
it by testing some of its further predictions, and use it to guide a discussion of the future
of GVCs in the aftermath of Brexit and COVID-19.
‘Traditional’ supply chains operate in a “make-to-stock” fashion: intermediates and
final goods are produced and put on shelves in warehouses for customers to collect. Such
a system works efficiently if demand forecasts are very accurate, but in complex interna-
tional supply networks geared towards handling large numbers of varieties, prediction
becomes difficult and inventories soar. In modern management systems by contrast –
developed in Japan in the 1970s and early 1980s – such costly buffer stocks are eradicated
through finely-tuned coordination of tasks, so that every production step is completed
just-in-time for the next one to begin. To enable such a system, it has to be “make-to-
order”: downstream demand information is relayed to stages upstream in real-time and
commencement of a task is conditional on such a signal.6
For the the first contribution of this paper, I use high quality survey information –
the questionnaire asked for whether or not a firm participates in a JIT supply chain – for
more than 3,000 representative (> 20 employees) French companies in all manufacturing
industries for 1997-2006. I document that JIT supply chain management is widespread
across all branches of manufacturing, rather than being an exclusive preoccupation for car
and textile producers. Moreover, participant firms in JIT supply chains tend to be larger
and more productive than their non-JIT counterparts. As a consequence, they account for
up to two thirds of aggregate employment and international trade in France and therefore
play a very significant economic role.
Furthermore, international trade and worldwide ownership information allow me to
examine the structure of French JIT supply networks regarding their fragmentation across
countries and the role of multinational production. First, comparing the trade partner
countries for international trade flows as a proxy for location, I find that JIT supply chains
are significantly more spatially concentrated than their ‘traditional’ counterparts. This de-
scriptive pattern holds for both distance and time-to-ship as measures of proximity, at the
extensive and intensive country margins, and when I control for a number of alternative
unrelated explanations. Moreover, firms that adopt JIT management practices during the
6Although JIT is sometimes viewed as a broader ‘philosophy’ – Schott et al. (2017) highlight stability of
supply relationships, while others stress product variety and flexibility (Ohno, 1988; Schonberger, 1982) – I
emphasize coordination and “make-to-order” aspects in this paper, which I believe are the most relevant for
global supply chains.
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sample period actively skew their international supply networks towards proximate trade
partners. My estimates imply that the distance elasticity of trade in JIT supply networks
is about 11 percent more negative than in ‘traditional’ ones (the overall gravity implied
elasticity being slightly less than one in absolute value (Head and Mayer, 2015)).
Second, French firms in JIT supply chains, compared to their ‘traditional’ counter-
parts, are significantly more likely to source any given intermediate in-house, both domesti-
cally and from abroad. This finding is not driven by the typical industry or firm level
characteristics that have been shown to affect the boundaries of multinational firms. It is
present both in subsidiary ownership and intrafirm trade data at the firm level – actual
transactions, and not only assets, are more vertically integrated – and the adoption of
JIT is associated with more in-house production at foreign subsidiaries. Quantitatively
speaking, trade is around 7 percentage points more likely to be intrafirm in JIT than in
non-JIT supply chains, which is a large difference given the overall share of related party
trade for France of around one third.
As a second contribution of this paper I propose a formal conceptual framework that
illustrates how a single mechanism – inventory holding due to mis-coordination – can
rationalize these patterns in the data. Consider a segment of a supply chain where a sin-
gle upstream supplier manufactures an intermediate, which is shipped to a downstream
buyer firm for further processing. In an uncertain world, both companies are continu-
ally hit by shocks, i.e., unexpected changes in their environments. Final demand may
be highly unpredictable, while upstream production may, for example, experience ma-
chine break-down or sudden input price changes. While both partners in a transaction
can adapt their activities to such changes, they will hold inventories to the extent that
their adaptation decisions are not fully coordinated and production may be disrupted.
JIT supply chain management is modelled as an information sharing technology, which
ensures that signals about downstream demand are shared with the supplier to facilitate
coordinated adaptation and thus reduce expensive buffer stocks.7
In this setting, skewing the supply network towards regional partners is a complemen-
tary strategy to JIT, in the sense that the efficiency gains of one organizational margin are
amplified by the other. Even if real-time demand information is available, a remote sup-
plier may not manage to deliver its goods in time, the composition of customer needs may
have changed, and the intermediate may have become obsolete due to these long ship-
ping times. JIT and joint ownership are complementary margins as well. Even though
suppliers have better information about the downstream demand conditions under JIT,
they make adaptation decisions to maximize their own local profits and thus create an
7In the early days of JIT in Japan, transmission of demand information took the form of little cards called
“kanban” that were routed through factories and which described in great detail what inputs were needed
from the next respective upstream stage (Ohno, 1988).
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externality downstream if they are independent from the buyer firm. Operating as a ver-
tically integrated firm constitutes a way of bringing adaptation incentives of individual
units in line with those of the entire segment of the supply chain.8
I validate this conceptual framework with supporting empirical evidence for further
predictions regarding industry heterogeneity in the two complementarities. First, the cor-
relations between JIT, in-house production and proximity are significantly stronger when
inventory costs are high, which is important evidence in favor of the inventory channel
at the heart of the model. Second, the patterns are stronger when demand shocks are
persistent: since any downstream signal is particularly useful for prediction and hence
valuable, the return from complementing JIT with in-house and spatially agglomerated
production is higher. Finally, if market conditions allow an independent downstream
firm to force inventory costs on the supplier via contractual penalties (as in the automo-
bile industry, for example), the complementarity between JIT and proximity is stronger:
valuable demand signals due to short order lags are combined with contractual incen-
tives for the supplier to actually use them and thus reduce (their share of) inventory
costs. By contrast, the complementarity between JIT and vertical integration is weaker:
pushing inventories onto the supplier is an alternative way to internalize the supply chain
externality, and hence align incentives for coordination, which is particularly effective if
demand information is available through the JIT system.
Finally, to illustrate the implications of my findings for how the structure of global
value chains may evolve in response to a rapidly changing political and natural envi-
ronment, I examine the cases of Brexit and COVID-19. Modelling Brexit as an increase
of waiting times at the border, I find that European manufacturing will become less JIT
intensive and hence lose efficiency. The effect on international trade patterns depends
on the balance of two forces. Frictions at the border bias all trade relationships towards
more proximate partners, but a lower overall JIT intensity will make trade less sensitive
to distance, since ‘traditional’ production networks are less concentrated in space. Unam-
biguously, by contrast, multinational companies will reduce their cross border activities
and FDI in manufacturing declines. Increased (perceived) uncertainty as a consequence
of the COVID-19 outbreak is predicted to make JIT production more attractive due to its
superior coordination abilities; all supply chains carry higher inventories and become
less efficient, but this effect will be less severe in JIT systems. As a result of the comple-
mentarities documented in this paper, international trade is predicted to become more
spatially concentrated and more dominated by a few large and integrated multinational
companies. The extent of all adjustments varies strongly by industry and my empiri-
8While several mechanisms may well be at work, the conceptualization of firm boundaries I propose
is a natural candidate in the context of highly coordinated production and I discuss and rule out several
alternative theories like property rights or rent-seeking in Sections 2.3, 3 and 4.
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cal findings suggest three margins that may be useful for forecasting – inventory costs,
demand persistence and inventory pushing.
This paper expands two strands of research on the structure of international value
chains and contributes to the literature on the role of management. First, relating to the
spatial set-up of production networks, there is a small number of industry case studies.
Evans and Harrigan (2005), for example, examine the U.S. textile business and show
that fast fashion items tend to be manufactured in countries nearby.9 The present paper
expands on these findings by showing that JIT production networks are more regional
across the whole of manufacturing, and that this difference compared to ‘traditional’
value chains is of first-order economic magnitude. Conceptually, Evans and Harrigan
(2005) and Harrigan and Venables (2006) explain this economic geography fact by ‘flexible
production’, where surprise changes in demand can be addressed by sourcing from close
suppliers with low order lags. While yielding the same result, my alternative formulation
of this economic problem emphasizes the role of information (cf. Steinwender, 2018) and
makes the broader point that space is a friction for coordination and thus interacts with
other margins of organization like firm boundaries.
More generally, this paper shows that JIT supply chain management is a relevant
consideration for the broader literature on location choice in GVCs (e.g., Johnson and
Noguera, 2012; Baldwin and Venables, 2013; Koopman et al., 2014; Antràs and de Gortari,
2020) and on gravity in goods trade in general. In particular, it may have played an
important role in explaining the distance puzzle (Berthelon and Freund, 2008): despite
a substantial fall in trade costs over the second half of the 20th century, distance is as
important a barrier to trade as decades earlier (potentially because travel times have not
been reduced commensurably).
Secondly, regarding firm boundaries in global supply chains, the only studies that
examine the role of JIT are Keane and Feinberg (2006, 2007). They present suggestive
empirical evidence at the industry level that the increase in intrafirm trade between US
firms and their Canadian affiliates in the late 1980s and early 1990s may be attributable to
advances in logistics technology and in particular to JIT supply chain management. I ex-
pand on their insights using significantly more detailed and direct firm level information
to show that JIT supply chains are indeed more vertically integrated in terms of several
proxies for in-house production. Moreover, I propose a novel organizational model based
on coordination and inventory holding in the tradition of Transaction Cost Economics
(TCE) to explain this pattern.10
9Other works include McCann and Fingleton (1996) and Holl et al. (2010), who show a similar pattern in
eletronics and automobiles for Scotland and Spain.
10My conceptual framework builds on ideas related to Legros and Newman (2013); Alfaro et al. (2016).
In contrast to their work, I micro-found conflicts of interest between parties as a multi-tasking problem
6
More broadly, my study has implications for the literature on firm boundaries in
supply chains (Antràs, 2003; Antràs and Helpman, 2004; Antràs and Chor, 2013; Del
Prete and Rungi, 2017; Berlingieri et al., 2018; Alfaro et al., 2016, 2019) and the firm level
determinants of multinational activity (Corcos et al., 2013): it highlights that supply chain
management considerations are potential drivers of integration decisions.
Finally, this paper contributes to the study of management practices and their implica-
tions for firms and the economy. Prominently, the World Management Survey (WMS) first
presented in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) has been used to show that better managed
firms command a productivity premium and are more likely to participate in interna-
tional trade (Bloom et al., forthcoming). Furthermore, consistent with my data, the WMS
provides evidence that JIT practices are not ubiquitous, but usually associated with the
more productive and larger companies. While the information I use in this study pertains
only to French firms and their global activities, this focus makes it possible to study the
international production network implications of JIT supply chain management in great
detail.
2 Characterizing JIT Supply Chains Empirically
Generally speaking, information about management is hard to come by, which has promp-
ted comprehensive data collection efforts (see, for example, Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007;
Bloom et al., 2016). For this paper I obtained access to the French firm level survey
Enquête sur les Changements Organisationels et l’Informatisation (COI), which collected
information in two waves, 1997 and 2006, from both employers and their employees about
how firms are internally organized.11 A random sample of firms with more than 50 em-
ployees (20 in 2006) was surveyed and the response rates were very high (88%, 84%),
which is not unusual for French firm surveys. The 2006 wave asked many questions for
both the current year and for 2003 retrospectively, so that I can extract information for an
unbalanced panel of about 3,000 manufacturing firms (ISIC Rev. 3 codes 15-37) for three
individual years spanning the decade between the mid 1990s and the mid 2000s.
Based on JIT related questions, the main variable I construct is a firm level indicator
J ITf t that equals one whenever a firm f in year t reports that it either sourced inputs from
a supplier or shipped output to a customer using a just-in-time regime.
due to adaptation in an uncertain environment. Furthermore, I emphasize the complementarity with other
organizational margins that facilitate coordination, namely the spatial set-up of supply relationships and
information sharing.
11Other work that has used COI includes Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Janod and Saint-Martin (2004). More
information can be found at https://www.enquetecoi.net/ and in the in-depth description featured in
Greenan and Mairesse (1999).
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This variable has three limitations. First, firms may misreport if they do not under-
stand what JIT means and/or do not have sufficient information to answer the question.
While it is difficult to assess the extent of this problem, several arguments inspire con-
fidence that it is not a first-order concern. For one, the questionnaires contained an at-
tachment that offers detailed explanations of a range of specific terms used in the survey,
including for the JIT related questions.12 Moreover, and slightly anticipating the results
below, JIT firms hold significantly lower inventories than their non-JIT peers even within
highly disaggregated industries. Since this is the main objective most companies pursue
when they adopt a JIT regime, this is a tell-tale sign that the JIT variable is meaningful.
Finally, if misreporting happened for reasons unrelated to firm characteristics or the spa-
tial and ownership structure of supply chains, the differences between JIT and non-JIT
supply chains are understated and the results in this paper are lower bounds to the true
correlations.
The second limitation is that coordination and other efforts to minimize inventories
are a matter of degree, while my information on JIT in the COI survey is only binary.
I acknowledge this shortcoming here – and refer to J ITf t as ‘JIT intensity’ occasionally
below. The empirical patterns presented therefore reflect differences in group averages of
more and of less intensive “JITers”.
The third and final limitation is that there is no information about which exact product
lines or supply relationships are managed just-in-time.13 Both aspects introduce measure-
ment error and tend to attenuate the results, with the consequence that my estimates tend
to understate true differences between JIT and non-JIT supply chains.
2.1 Prevalence, Importance, and Firm Characteristics
Online Appendix Table C.1 illustrates the prevalence and importance of JIT firms in terms
of sheer numbers, employment, and trade shares at the 2 digit industry level (23 manu-
facturing industries). In the aggregate, slightly less than half of all firms report that they
participate in JIT supply chains. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, JIT firms account for
a sizeable share of companies in all industries; their share ranges from 30% in “textiles”
to 67% in “motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers”. JIT firms are, however, dispropor-
tionally important economically: they account for an outsized share of economic activity
in almost every industry and for roughly two thirds of both aggregate employment and
international trade.
12These explanations in French and English are presented in Online Appendix A.1.
13For the year 1997 this information is available separately for sourcing, producing and shipping. As these
activities are highly interdependent and therefore strongly correlated, however, this additional detail cannot
be used to, for example, validate the survey responses further.
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Examining the role of JIT supply chains in international trade in slightly more detail,
it is clear that JIT firms source and produce goods that France trades intensively with
other countries. Online Appendix Table C.2 shows that they account for more than 80 %
of value traded in the three most important HS 2 digit products; “vehicles”, “electrical
machinery and equipment (without computers)”, and “equipment for nuclear energy
generation” (these account for a third of all French international trade). Once again, this
pattern underlines the significance of JIT supply chains, at least for the French economy.
To characterize JIT and ‘traditional’, non-JIT firms, I use balance sheet information
from FICUS, an administrative fiscal database that covers the universe of French firms,
and the universe of international trade transactions provided by the French customs office
DGDDI. All details on how the different variables are constructed are presented in Online
Appendix A.1.
Table 1: JIT Premia
(1) (2) (3) Obs
log sales 0.766*** 0.555*** 0.084*** 12,407
log employment 0.622*** 0.434*** 12,411
log labour productivity 0.145*** 0.122*** 0.084*** 12,407
log VA productivity 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.031*** 12,327
log capital intensity 0.251*** 0.174*** 0.094*** 12,131
log intangible capital intensity 0.082** 0.074** 0.003 11,542
log skill intensity 0.014* 0.017*** 0.001 12,408
log inventory (finals) turnover 0.296*** 0.250*** 0.142*** 4,484
log inventory (interm.) turnover 0.087*** 0.099*** 0.143*** 11,812
Prob. international trader 0.077*** 0.049*** 0.011 12,411
log total trade value 0.960*** 0.729*** 0.142*** 10,416
log # CN products traded 0.436*** 0.333*** 0.047** 10,416
log mean shipment value 0.299*** 0.234*** 0.038* 10,416
log # transactions 0.285*** 0.247*** 0.109*** 8,231
Additional covariates Year FE 4d Ind. 4d Ind.
× Year FE × Year FE,
log empl.
Every cell in columns (1)-(3) is the coefficient estimate of a firm × year level OLS regression of
the row variable on a dummy equal to one if a firm reports being part of a JIT supply chain,
possibly including the covariates reported. Common sample imposed across columns within
each row. 312 industries classified according to NAF Rev. 1. Standard errors are clustered at
the 4 digit industry by year level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Each cell in Table 1 contains the point estimate from a regression of the row variable
on the JIT indicator and I refer to them as ‘JIT premia’. The results in column (1) capture
raw differences in the cross-section, while the estimates in columns (2) and (3) use only
within industry × year variation. Compared to ‘traditional’ firms, participants in JIT
supply chains tend to be larger in terms of sales and employment, are more productive,
and are somewhat more capital intensive. Lending further credibility to the JIT indicator,
Table 1 illustrates that inventory turnover – the ratio of sales to the value of inventories –
is substantially higher at JIT firms. Finally, JIT firms are more likely to trade and, if they
do so, trade more; they typically transact more frequently and transact a higher number
of distinct products.
To interpret these patterns, it is important to keep in mind that JIT systems typically
require substantial overhead that is at least piecewise independent of the scale of op-
erations or output. These costs include, for example, the expenditure associated with
employing supply chain managers capable of running a complex and highly coordinated
supply network, maintenance of common IT structures or interfaces, and joint research
and development with the goal of interlocked products and processes. A plausible inter-
pretation of the finding that JIT firms command a size and productivity premium is that
only large companies are in a position to amortize these fixed overhead expenditures. In
other words, firms may select into JIT supply chain participation based on a profitabil-
ity or capability advantage. I treat the JIT premia as consistent with, and as supporting
evidence for, such a mechanism when I build the conceptual framework in Section 3.14
2.2 Location Choice in JIT Supply Chains
Empirical specification and data
I compare international transactions of JIT firms to those of non-JIT ones to see if there
are significant differences in how trade patterns correlate with trade partner location.
In light of the particular features of JIT supply chain management and some limited
empirical evidence from previous industry studies (e.g. Evans and Harrigan, 2005), I am
interested in proximity as the spatial characteristic of a trade partner and estimate the
following baseline model:
14In Schonberger (1982), page 4, the author describes several implementation related and recurring fixed
expenditures associated with JIT. He concludes that “[o]f course, these developmental and administrative
costs are are more easily amortized by the large volume producer.”
10




βz J ITf t × 1(distancec ∈ quantile binz) + β3X f ct+
γict + γ f t + γp + ε f cpt, (1)
where f icpt indexes a trade flow of CN 8 digit product p between country c and firm f
operating in 4 digit NAF Rev. 1 industry i in year t.15 I sum over import and export flows,
since, as stated above, my firm level JIT information is silent about which transactions are
managed JIT and which are not. Finally, Z denotes the total number of quantile bins
used.
The two dependent variables of interest are the extensive and intensive country mar-
gins of trade. To span the product space for every firm, I keep its 10 most important CN 8
digit codes according to total trade value in every year. These account for 88% of the total
trade volume of France with Europe. I focus on these crucial goods because they are the
most likely to enter corporate supply chain considerations and because it helps keep the
sample size in check without losing much information (the median firm in 2006 trades in
25 products, the one at the 75th percentile in 59).16
The extensive margin is defined as an indicator that equals 100 whenever a firm re-
ports trading a given product with a given country c in year t, and zero if it reports no
trade in that product with c in t:
extensive margin f cpt ≡ 1(tradevalue f cpt > 0) ∗ 100.
A natural intensive margin measure is the Euro value of a trade flow. This vari-
able is, however, famously right skewed and contains a very large number of zeros –
a log transformation that could address the first problem would therefore imply that
many observations were dropped. As an alternative I employ the inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation (Burbidge et al., 1988). The resulting variable is approximately normally
distributed and, for high values, all coefficient estimates can be interpreted as if the de-
pendent variable was log transformed. For small values, the inverse hyperbolic sine does
not do as good a job in approximating an elasticity, but since large flows account for the
bulk of international trade, this shortcoming is of second-order importance here.17
For the main analysis I restrict the sample to 41 European countries for which there is
15I concord all flows over time to CN 1996. While the product dimension could be integrated out for the
baseline, I keep the data disaggregated for further exercises below. The main patterns using the aggregated
sample are robust, see Online Appendix A.2.
16The main results are robust to using the top 25 products, see Online Appendix A.2.
17The main results are similar when using the log transform, see Online Appendix A.2.
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(population-weighted) distance information available in the gravity data from CEPII. The
reason for this geographical focus is that I expect the differences between JIT and non-JIT
to be salient in the immediate vicinity of France, while trade with Australia or Chile, to
mention two arguably extreme examples, is unlikely to ever be conducted with a JIT idea
in mind.18
Panel A of Online Appendix Table C.3 provides summary statistics for both margins of
interest. A typical firm trades its average product with 8.8 countries, but the distribution is
highly skewed across firms and products, which is a well known fact about international
trade. Conditional on trading a good with a location, the average trade value is about 1.2
million EUR in a year, but the median flow is much smaller at 40 thousand.
The main regressors are a set of interactions between the JIT indicator and quantile
bin dummies derived from the across country distance distribution.19 The variation in
the quantile variable is illustrated in Online Appendix Figure C.1, where I present a map
of the European countries in my sample and their respective quintile bin.
Given that countries in the final distance quantile bin provide the reference category,
the βz coefficients are expected to be positive and decreasing in z: all firms trade more
with close locations compared to remote ones as prescribed by gravity, but this pattern is
expected to be stronger for JIT firms. In other words, the distance elasticity is higher for
them in absolute value.
To isolate the correlation of interest I purge the estimates of observed and unobserved
‘confounders’ with a set of additional control variables, captured by X f ct, and a com-
prehensive fixed effects strategy. Starting with the latter, the industry × trade partner
country × year effects (γict) ensure that I compare trade flows of firms that operate in
the same narrow industry and trade with the same location. As a consequence, neither
industry or country specific characteristics, nor selection patterns – for example in line
with comparative advantage – drive my results. Similarly, historical patterns and path de-
pendencies are removed from the variation: industries in proximate locations may have
developed infrastructure or agglomerated clusters that favor JIT style operations due to
policy or completely unrelated reasons, which might create an association between JIT
and locational choice that may have nothing to do with supply chain management. For
example, the Élysée process that began in 1963 may have led to much closer cooperation
between France and Germany, which today facilitates coordinated supply chains but has
nothing to do with JIT. Furthermore, these fixed effects address certain selection patterns.
18The main results are similar, but expectedly slightly weaker when using the top 100 trading partners
worldwide, see Online Appendix A.2.
19In Online Appendix Table C.4 I show that the results are very similar when I use the most comprehensive
and reliable estimates of shipping times for France, which were produced by Berman et al. (2013) based on
marine and road transportation. This variable is highly correlated with my baseline distance measure – .82
between (log) distance and (log) time-to-ship – but has a significant number of missings.
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Taking the food industry as an example, JIT firms may specialize on time-sensitive items
produced only in some countries, while non-JIT firms do not. The former may thus be
subject to a different distribution of shocks compared to the latter, which might be picked
up by the β̂z estimates.
One may still be worried that it is not distance that makes certain trade partner coun-
tries more attractive for JIT supply chains, but other country characteristics. A plausible
alternative mechanism is that JIT supply chains require more communication to achieve
smooth operation and hence disproportionally benefit from the same language, language
proximity, or more generally cultural similarity; a good example is the relationship be-
tween France and (Western-)Switzerland. Importantly, these variables are often correlated
with distance. To address this concern I include interactions of the JIT indicator with ap-
propriate proxies for these margins in the regressions. Furthermore, as the case of Brexit
strikingly illustrates, regulatory conditions that facilitate speedy processing times ben-
efit JIT supply chains disproportionately and are typically found between nearby trade
partners. To address these issues I include JIT interactions with several trade agreement
measures, an EU and a Euro membership indicator, a legal system indicator, and the
V-Dem property rights protection index in the regressions. Finally, non-homothetic pref-
erences may lead to greater demand for speedy transactions in richer countries, which
tend to be close to France. I address this concern by controlling for interactions with
income and size proxies.
Main results
Figure 1 illustrates the main results from specification (1) with quintile bins, where
darker colors indicate larger point estimates – all underlying results and further details
are reported in Online Appendix Table C.5. Trade with close partners is more likely, and
substantially larger, in JIT supply chains than in ‘traditional’ ones; but this difference
decreases rapidly when the trade partner is farther away. In other words, JIT trade flows
are, in a descriptive sense, more sensitive to distance than their non-JIT counterparts –
they are more regional.20
But how much more “regional”? One way to illustrate the economic magnitudes of
the estimated coefficients, and to see if they are of first-order importance economically, is
to compare them to variation in the raw data. In my estimation sample, the probability
of trading a product with a country in the first distance quintile bin – which features
countries like Germany – is 19.5 percent for a non-JIT firm. That for the third quintile –
which features countries like Hungary – is 3.7 percent. The difference in point estimates
20The findings do not imply that JIT firms trade less than their non-JIT counterparts with remote locations
in absolute terms, since the model estimated is a difference-in-differences.
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for the two quintiles suggests that firms in modern JIT supply chains show a steeper
gradient across the two categories by (1.089− 0.211)/(19.5− 3.7) ≈ 5.6 percent. Similarly,
the gradient at the intensive margin for non-JIT trade flows is 4.177− 0.737 = 3.440, so
that the baseline estimates suggest a difference between JIT and non-JIT firms of (0.488−
0.120)/3.440 ≈ 10.7 percent. A plausible illustration of magnitudes is difficult in this
difference-in-differences exercise, but these comparisons nevertheless demonstrate that
supply chain management may be a relevant concern for location choice.
Robustness checks
Table 2 presents a selection of robustness checks. For the purpose of exposition I turn
to tercile bins and column (1) repeats the baseline for comparison.
First, one may be concerned that firm characteristics other than participation in JIT
supply chains drive the results. JIT firms, which tend to produce varieties that have a high
capital or skill content, may have to resort to proximate trade partners, since countries
that consume and specialize in such products are clustered around France. The estimates
may therefore be confounded and higher than they should be. Furthermore, if JIT firms
are larger and more productive, they are more likely to trade with remote locations. The
estimates could thus be smaller than they would be due to the correlation between JIT
and proximity alone.
The first step to address these concerns is to include firm × country fixed effects, so
that the interaction coefficients are estimated using time variation in the JIT indicator.
Intuitively, I examine how adoption or abandonment of JIT correlates with changes in
the structure of supply chains in space. To ensure that there is sufficient time for such
changes to take place, I limit the sample to the years 1997 and 2006. As column (2) in Table
2 shows, firms that adopt JIT supply chain practices skew their international production
networks towards proximate trade partners, especially at the extensive margin.
The second step in the investigation of firm characteristics that may act as confounders
is to control for interactions of the distance dummies with them directly. I add the relevant
controls to the previous empirical specification in column (3), which constitutes the most
demanding specification I investigate. While the point estimates fall slightly and lose their
statistical significance at conventional levels, the changes are economically small and the
order of magnitude is retained. At the extensive margin, the adopter coefficient is even
larger than the preferred baseline estimate.
The second robustness check pertains to selection into the types of products that are
being traded. They differ, for example, in perishability, complexity, bulkiness, and their
input requirements, all of which make them differentially likely to be traded between dif-
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Table 2: Location – Baseline Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Extensive margin
JIT firm × 1(distance tercile 1) 0.920*** 1.633** 1.299 0.625* 0.678** 0.958**
(0.271) (0.809) (0.864) (0.373) (0.332) (0.394)
JIT firm × 1(distance tercile 2) 0.180 0.602 0.317 0.205 -0.047 0.019
(0.184) (0.518) (0.553) (0.252) (0.229) (0.265)
Observations 2,994,486 2,005,443 1,849,221 1,669,833 2,954,127 1,594,527
R-squared 0.303 0.460 0.463 0.597 0.378 0.316
Panel B: Intensive margin
JIT firm × 1(distance tercile 1) 0.311*** 0.265 0.179 0.263*** 0.295**** 0.308***
(0.060) (0.172) (0.185) (0.082) (0.074) (0.089)
JIT firm × 1(distance tercile 2) 0.071* 0.059 0.005 0.090 0.034 0.042
(0.041) (0.110) (0.118) (0.055) (0.051) (0.059)
Observations 2,994,486 2,005,443 1,849,221 1,669,833 2,954,127 1,594,527
R-squared 0.321 0.480 0.484 0.621 0.397 0.334
Specification
Sample full long long full full high
difference difference roadshare
Firm × Year FE YES YES YES YES
4d Industry × Country ×
YES YES YES
Year FE
8d CN Product FE YES YES YES
Firm $\times Country FE YES YES
Additional firm controls YES
Baseline FEs × 8d CN Product FE YES
French Region × Country ×
YES
4d Industry × Year FE
The dependent variables are a dummy equal to 100 if, in a given year, a firm-product is traded with a country, and zero if not
traded with that country (“extensive margin”); or the – inverse hyperbolic sine transformed – value of such a trade flow (“intensive
margin”). The regressors are a dummy equal one if a firm is part of a just-in-time (JIT) supply chain in a year, and zero if not,
interacted with tercile dummies from the across country distance distribution with that JIT dummy. Interacted country controls:
JIT dummy interacted with a) country dummies equal to one if French is ethnologically the main language; it is officially the same
language; the partner shares a majority religion with France; the partner is landlocked; an FTA, RTA, or GSP agreement with the EU
is in place; the partner’s legal system is based on the Code civil; the partner is a member of the EU; the partner has the Euro; and
b) (log) GDP; (log) GDP per capita; (log) land area; the V-Dem property rights protection index. Additional firm controls: distance
tercile indicators interacted with physical capital intensity; intangible capital intensity; skill intensity; sales; employment; VA per
worker of firm (all in logs). There are 22 regions in France. ‘long difference’ refers to a sample covering the years 1997 and 2006.
The ‘high roadshare’ sample includes trade flows of firms in industries whose value share of aggregate trade shipped via roads is
above the median across industries. Sample size varies due to different samples and since singletons are dropped. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the firm × country level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
ferent country × industry pairs. JIT firms may sort systematically into certain categories
for unrelated reasons and my estimates may be confounded. Alternatively, if one believes
that selection into different products is an important margin for either the adoption of JIT
or for how big its efficiency gain is, it is interesting to study what share of the location
patterns is driven by that. To address these issues – at the cost of a reduced sample –
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I allow all relevant fixed effects to vary by 8 digit CN product, see column (4) of Table
2. Reassuringly, changes in the magnitudes of the coefficients are small, especially at the
intensive margin.
The third set of robustness checks addresses concerns about firms’ locations within
France and their preferred means of transportation. In particular, JIT firms could simply
happen to reside systematically closer to the borders with Germany, Belgium, or Spain
to facilitate trade with partners there. Simple gravity considerations would then explain
the positive correlation between JIT and proximity. Moreover, the baseline results could
be accounted for by local infrastructure available to firms, like highways or airports. In
column (5) of Table 2, I therefore interact the γict effects with an indicator for each of the
(at the time) 22 French regions, so that the estimating variation comes from comparing
two firms within the same region and industry who trade with the same partner country.
The result is reassuring provided that the majority of firms produces at the plant it is
officially registered at. In column (1) of Online Appendix Table C.12 I confirm that the
main results remain unchanged in the substantially smaller sample of firms with a single
establishment.
One may also worry that the transportation mode for flows in JIT supply chains is sys-
tematically different, which could cause differential freight costs to drive the correlations.
Column (4) of Table 2 shows that product characteristics do not appear to pose a major
problem, so that transportation mode – to the extent that there is very little variation at
the highly detailed CN 8 digit level (9.5k categories) – is unlikely to explain the spatial
concentration of JIT supply chains. Moreover, in column (6) I restrict the sample to down-
stream industries that transport their goods almost exclusively by road, i.e., those above
the across industry median of 83 percent of the total value shipped. The fact that the
estimates are virtually the same in this subsample as in the full one further corroborates
the conviction that differences in transportation mode do not play an important role for
my findings.
I have conducted a series of so far unmentioned further robustness checks, which, for
conciseness, I present in Online Appendix A.2. These include subsample analyses (drop-
ping the most JIT intensive sectors; including wholesalers; focussing on intermediates or
imports) and investigating the role of IT intensity and border effects.
2.3 Vertical Integration Patterns
Empirical specification and data
To generate econometric evidence I estimate the following model
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y f ijt = β1 J ITf t + β2X f t + γij + γt + ε f ijt , (2)
where i continues to denote the industry of French firm f in year t of my sample and j
denotes an (upstream) activity required for production of i.
The first dependent variable is an indicator equal to one hundred if firm f performs
activity j in-house, and zero if the activity is outsourced to a third party. The second one
is a similar indicator where only integration abroad is taken into account. I construct
these variables following a commonly applied strategy to foster comparability with other
research (e.g., Fan and Lang, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2010; Alfaro et al., 2016): First, I use
the 2002 U.S. Benchmark IO Table (concorded to ISIC Rev. 3) to obtain information about
which activities or intermediate inputs a firm in industry i needs for production. This IO
table is arguably very little affected by French firms’ management or ownership decisions,
but still provides valuable information about technology, since the U.S. and France are
relatively similar. I base my measure on the 100 most important upstream manufacturing
industries j for each downstream industry i according to direct requirements, because
key activities are much more likely to be relevant considerations in strategic decision
making.21 In the second step, I code an activity j as “integrated” if either the firm f itself
reports j as a secondary industry, or if an affiliate reports j as a primary or secondary
industry. For the variable “integrated abroad” I count activities of foreign affiliates only.
Since all firms have a primary industry i, I drop all observations where i = j, i.e., supply
relationships on the diagonal of the IO-table.
This type of measure of vertical integration can be interpreted as the potential for a
downstream firm f to source an intermediate input in-house and hence circumvent the
market. Information on worldwide ownership links and industry affiliations comes from
the database Liaisons financières entre sociétés (LiFi), which records information on all
business groups that operate in France.
Online Appendix Table C.3 reports several summary statistics for the two main depen-
dent variables. The overall share of integrated supply relationships j → i is 2.6 percent,
but this is driven by a small number of highly vertically integrated conglomerates. Inter-
nationally, since only a small subset of firms engages in FDI, it is no surprise that a mere
0.2 percent of all upstream-downstream relationships takes place within the boundary of
a single international business group. Once again, however, a few and large multination-
als entertain subsidiaries that can provide them with intermediate inputs.
The main regressor of interest is the J ITf t indicator. In line with anecdotal evidence
21The results are fully robust to using all 312 industries in my sample, see Online Appendix A.3. A slight
decrease in point estimates is expected given that firms tend to vertically integrate their most important
inputs (Berlingieri et al., 2018).
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in Keane and Feinberg (2007) that the increase in intrafirm trade between Canada and the
U.S. following CUSFTA may have been linked to JIT, its coefficient β1 is expected to be
positive: (multinational) JIT firms may try to complement their supply chain management
with asset ownership that allows for more direct control, as discussed in Section 3 below.
Specification (2) furthermore includes a set of upstream × downstream industry fixed
effects, γij. They are motivated by the empirical findings of a broad literature in orga-
nizational economics and international trade that examines the determinants of vertical
integration (for a review see Antràs, 2015). To the extent that they vary at the industry(-
pair) level, I remove confounders like the relative marginal investment contributions by
suppliers and customers as highlighted by property rights theories (PRT) of the boundary
of the firm (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Antràs, 2003) or the contracting environment and
relationship specificity for j → i transactions put at center stage by TCE approaches to
vertical integration (e.g., Williamson, 1985). In consequence, β1 is estimated by comparing
two French firms in the same narrow industry – one a participant of a JIT supply chain,
the other one not – with respect to whether the same upstream activity j is performed
in-house or outsourced.
Finally, I include a set of firm level control variables (value added per employee, cap-
ital intensity, and skill intensity) which are correlated with JIT supply chain participation
and may drive vertical integration (Corcos et al., 2013). I omit scale controls like employ-
ment and sales due to the mechanical relationship with vertical integration in the baseline
and examine their role in the robustness checks below.
Baseline results
Columns (1)-(3) in Table 3 illustrate the baseline results, where the fixed effects and
controls are introduced in turn, grouped by specifications that have either overall (Panel
A) or only foreign integration (Panel B) as a dependent variable. The JIT indicator is
positive and highly significant in the preferred specification in column (3): JIT firms
show a higher propensity to perform the average upstream activity in-house compared to
similar non-JIT firms – both in general and as a part of a multinational business group.22
Relating the magnitudes of the estimates to the overall means of the dependent variables,
shown in row “Coeff. / mean depvar (percent)”, reveals that these differences are of
first-order importance; the premia over sample means are 7.1 and 24.5 percent for overall
integration and integration abroad, respectively.
I describe an important robustness exercise for this finding here and present others
(regarding IT intensity, JIT intensive industries, and wholesalers) in Online Appendix A.3.
22Perhaps not coincidentally in the light of these findings, JIT was invented and has been very successfully
employed in Japan, where business groups (keiretsu) have a dominant position.
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Table 3: Vertical Integration – Baseline And Some Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Integrated
JIT firm 0.386*** 0.245*** 0.182*** 0.041
(0.071) (0.065) (0.065) (0.196)
Coeff. / mean depvar (percent) 15.0 9.5 7.1 1.6
Observations 1,048,434 1,048,434 1,048,434 699,404
R-squared 0.000 0.482 0.482 0.509
Panel B: Integrated abroad
JIT firm 0.098*** 0.068*** 0.057*** 0.122** 0.112**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.056) (0.055)
Coeff. / mean depvar (percent) 42.1 29.2 24.5 49.6 45.5
Observations 1,048,434 1,048,434 1,048,434 699,404 699,404
R-squared 0.000 0.153 0.154 0.178 0.178
Specification
Sample full full full long long
difference difference
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Downstr. 4d Ind. ×
YES YES YES YES
Upstr. 4d Ind. FE
Firm FE YES YES
Firm controls YES YES YES
Additional firm controls YES
The dependent variables are a dummy equal to one hundred if an upstream industry is integrated in a
firm/business group in a given year, and zero otherwise (“integrated”); or the same dummy where only for-
eign affiliations are counted (“integrated abroad”). The regressor is a dummy equal to one if a firm is part of a
just-in-time (JIT) supply chain in a year, and zero if not. Firm controls: value added per worker; physical capital
intensity; intangible capital intensity; skill intensity (all in logs). Additional firm controls: employment; sales
(both in logs). Common sample imposed across specifications (1)-(3). Sample size varies since singletons are
dropped. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
It is well known that multinational firms are typically the largest and most produc-
tive firms, potentially because they can select into maintaining affiliates and amortize the
associated overhead abroad. To avoid spurious correlation – after all, JIT firms also com-
mand a size and productivity premium as shown above – I follow two strategies. First,
I include firm fixed effects in the baseline regression. Secondly, I add a firm’s domestic
employment and sales as scale covariates directly. This is only possible for foreign inte-
gration, since there is a mechanical relationship between carrying out more activities and
having more employees. Once again, I exclude the year 2003 from the sample to give
adopting or abandoning firms sufficient time to reorganize their supply networks.
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The results are reported in columns (4) and (5) of Table 3. While the “JIT adopter”
coefficient for foreign integration is economically substantial and statistically significant,
the JIT coefficient for overall integration drops almost to zero. A possible conclusion
from this check is that adopting JIT supply chain management is correlated with more
vertical integration and that French firms adjusted their supply chains primarily abroad,
potentially even substituting some domestic suppliers for foreign ones.
Different measures of vertical integration
The indicator variables for ownership have two shortcomings. First, the different
upstream industries are very heterogeneous in their contributions to final output, yet
enter the baseline regressions in symmetric fashion. A car manufacturer, for example,
needs an engine, which accounts for a high cost share, as well as seats and car glass,
which account for much less of the value of a car in terms of its input costs. Integration
of only the latter two activities means a relatively low degree, while in-house production
of engines and car glass implies a higher degree of vertical integration along the value
chain conceptually. In other words, the indicator variable cannot capture the intensity of
vertical integration.
Following standard practice to facilitate comparison, I use an index
VI f it = ∑
j∈J f it
DRij ∗ 100, J f it ≡ {j 6= i|integrated f ijt = 1}
of vertical integration as an alternative dependent variable. DRij denotes the 2002 U.S.
direct requirement of industry i from upstream industry j. This index is the share of total
expenditure on activities that a firm can potentially keep within its boundary.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, I show the result of regressing VI f it (and its equiv-
alent counting only integration abroad) on the JIT indicator, a set of firm controls, and a
set of downstream industry × year fixed effects. Relative to the sample average, JIT firms
have a substantially higher intensity of vertical integration (premia over means of 12.1
and 45.7 %), a difference most pronounced for multinational activity.
The second shortcoming of the integrated indicator variables is that they capture asset
ownership and hence only the potential to source inputs in-house. To understand whether
actual transactions of goods are more likely to happen within the boundary of the firm,
too, I examine intrafirm trade data. The French firm level survey EIIG covers a random
sample of firms with foreign affiliates in a single cross-section.23 It provides data on the
23Unfortunately, EIIG is only available for the year 1999, which is not part of the JIT sample from COI-TIC.
I make the assumption that firms did not change their JIT status between 1997 and 1999 and match the
intrafirm trade data to the first cross-section of my JIT sample. Further information about EIIG can be found
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Table 4: Vertical Integration – Additional Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES integration integration integration intrafirm intrafirm
index index index trade trade
abroad abroad share share
JIT firm 0.613** 0.243*** 0.129** 6.731*** 5.399***
(0.250) (0.065) (0.063) (1.874) (1.894)
Coeff. / mean depvar (percent) 12.1 45.7 24.2 22.2 17.8
Observations 10,417 10,417 10,417 37,599 37,599
R-squared 0.343 0.275 0.286 0.286 0.294
Sample (1) (1) (1) (2) (2)
Downstr. 4d Ind. × Year FE YES YES YES
Downstr. 4d Ind. FE YES YES
4d HS Product FE YES YES
Flow FE YES YES
Country FE YES YES
Firm controls YES YES YES YES YES
Additional firm controls YES YES
The dependent variables are the firm level sum of all direct requirements by a firm’s downstream industry from
integrated upstream industries (“integration index”); or the same index counting only integration abroad (“integration
index abroad”); or the – percentage point – value share of a firm’s international trade flows (“intrafirm trade share”).
The regressor is a dummy equal to one if a firm is part of a just-in-time (JIT) supply chain in a year, and zero if not.
Firm controls: value added per worker; physical capital intensity; intangible capital intensity; skill intensity (all in
logs). Additional firm controls: employment; sales (both in logs). “Flow FE” refers to a dummy equal to one for export
flows, and zero for import flows. Sample (1): all downstream firm-years from the full sample. Sample (2): all 4 digit
HS trade flows associated with the firms in the full sample (1997 only). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the firm level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
value share of individual trade flows that was sourced within the boundary of the firm.
My alternative dependent variable is therefore “intrafirm trade share f pcot”, where p is a
4 digit HS product traded, c continues to denote the trading partner country, and o is the
type of flow, i.e. either an im- or an export.
In column (4) of Table 4, I regress this variable on the JIT indicator, a set of firm
controls, and on a set of downstream industry i, upstream 4 digit HS product p, and
flow o fixed effects. The results from this exercise support my baseline findings and at
the same time establish a novel insight: transactions along JIT supply chains are more
likely to occur between related entities and, due to the prevalence of JIT, account for a
large share of intrafirm trade. In particular, flows where the French party reports being
embedded in a JIT supply chain are about 6.7 percentage points more likely to happen
within a multinational firm than those where the French firm operates in a ‘traditional’
in Online Appendix A.1.
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way – for comparison, the overall intrafirm trade share is roughly one third.
Ruling out lock-in and technology diffusion as explanations
Motivated by both the literature on the boundary of the firm in imperfect contracting
environments, I finally investigate to what extent the relationship between JIT and vertical
integration is an outcome of relationship-specificity or “lock-in”. To enable extreme levels
of coordination two parties may have to share sensitive information, make substantial
adjustments to their production processes, or make long-term location decisions geared
toward one another. Such a lock-in could lead to higher quasi-rents and therefore to
integration in line with a rent-seeking rationale. To study whether this is a potential
explanation, I posit that such lock-in effects are particularly important for industries that
process highly differentiated, complex goods with a substantial share of non-routine task
input. By contrast, simple and easily codifiable products can be ordered fairly quickly
from several sources and require little information exchange. I create a single “lock-in
index” to measure these aspects based on the Rauch (1999) classification of homogeneous
vs. differentiated goods, the Harvard Complexity Index for goods, and the share of non-
routine tasks from Costinot et al. (2011) (details are provided in Online Appendix A.1).
For the results reported in the first four columns of Online Appendix Table C.6, I
repeat the baseline specifications (2), but restrict the sample to supply relationships where
the lock-in index is below the median in the downstream industry (odd columns) and, in
addition, to those where it is below the median in the upstream industry (even columns).
The point estimates are similar to the overall baseline and typically far from significantly
different. These insights do not change when I use the integration intensity indices in
columns (5) and (6), or intrafirm trade shares in column (7). While lock-in effects may
be at play in JIT managed supply chains, I therefore conclude that they are unlikely to
provide a particularly cogent explanation for the integration patterns I document in this
paper.
This robustness check also speaks to the concern that JIT firms have to share more
sensitive information about their technology with other parties and that the protection
of such knowledge leads to vertical integration (e.g., Ethier, 1986). This channel may
not be relevant even a priori since it is at least not obvious why firm boundaries protect
knowledge better than other contracts in a world with high worker turn-over, reasonable
IPR protection via patents and trademarks (enforced by an industrious legal profession),
and intense networking between managers. Notwithstanding, the fact that JIT and vertical
integration are positively correlated even for simple and homogeneous products instils
confidence that this channel is no first-order concern.
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3 A Conceptual Model of JIT Supply Chains
In this section I propose a conceptual framework to explain the patterns in the data docu-
mented above. Downstream buyers source intermediate inputs from upstream suppliers
in an uncertain environment. While both partners in such a transaction can adapt to
upstream and downstream shocks, they will hold inventories to the extent that these
adaptation decisions are not fully coordinated and production might be disrupted. JIT
supply chain management is modelled as an information sharing technology, which en-
sures that signals about downstream demand are shared with the supplier to facilitate
coordinated adaptation and thus reduce expensive buffer stocks.
Even if real-time demand information is available, a remote supplier may not manage
to deliver its goods in time to satisfy the precise needs of customers; in other words, the
intermediate may have become obsolete due to long shipping times. Skewing the supply
network towards regional partners, even at the price of higher primary factor costs, is
therefore a complementary strategy to JIT.
Moreover, even though suppliers have better information about demand under JIT,
they make adaptation decisions to maximize their own profits and thus create an ex-
ternality downstream if they are independent from the buyer. Operating as a vertically
integrated, multi-plant firm constitutes a way of bringing adaptation incentives of indi-
vidual units in line with those of the entire segment of the supply chain. JIT and joint
ownership are therefore complements in the sense that the efficiency gains of one organi-
zational margin are amplified by the other.24
There are at least two other mechanisms that may play a role in explaining the vertical
integration patterns in the data. First, if JIT systems require more relationship specific in-
vestments there may be scope for hold-up by either party and vertical integration is more
likely. As I have shown above in Section 2.3, however, the main stylized fact holds even
in environments where parties are not locked into their relationships. Second, the PRT
explanation of vertical integration posits that ownership is allocated to maximize the sur-
plus arising from a supply relationship. Asset ownership improves outside options when
the relationship breaks down and hence confers incentives to invest ex ante. A likely
prediction of this theory is that a JIT set-up works best between independent parties:
24Conceptually, the boundary of the firm in this framework is defined by a TCE mechanism. My ideas
and assumptions build on (1) the adaptation theory of the boundary of the firm (Simon, 1951; Williamson,
1975; Forbes and Lederman, 2009) in that ownership confers residual control rights in situations where
adaptation to uncertainty is not resolved by contracts; and on (2) the incentive systems theory Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1991, 1994) in that ownership patterns affect decision making in a multi-tasking environment
(local vs. coordinated adaptation). Furthermore, the model is closely related to Legros and Newman (2013)
and Alfaro et al. (2016) in that it emphasizes coordination motives for vertical integration. In contrast to their
work, I micro-found conflicts of interest between parties as a multi-tasking problem due to adaptation in an
uncertain environment.
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both plants must be devoted to mutual coordination and therefore ex ante investments
by both parties are important. This implication is, however, at odds with my empiri-
cal evidence. Finally, the internal capital market of a large multinational may alleviate
suppliers’ concerns about financial hold-up, which may be particularly important for the
close relationships that typically support JIT operations. At least in the context of France,
where the overwhelming majority of suppliers are located in Europe and therefore oper-
ate in an excellent institutional environment, such concerns are arguably of second-order
importance.
I first introduce a baseline model with a JIT adoption decision only and then give




There is a continuum of downstream firms in a single industry who produce hori-
zontally differentiated varieties under monopolistic competition. These are only locally
consumed and quantity demand is derived from CES preferences,
x(p(ω)) = Bp(ω)−α,
where B is a demand shifter, p(ω) is the price set by the producer of variety ω, and α > 1
captures the price elasticity of demand. For the purpose of this paper it suffices to posit
that there is a measure of potentially active downstream firms and abstract from free
entry. This general set-up corresponds well to the empirical exercises in this paper, where
industry × year fixed effects ensure that all estimating variation stems from differences
across firms within the same sector of activity in the same year.
The final good producers each source a single intermediate input, which is specific to
their own variety and which they transform into output.25 There is at least one indepen-
dent supplier firm for each intermediate and, for now, these suppliers are only resident
in a single location indexed by τ ∈ N+. To save on notation, τ captures three aspects
in the model: First, it is equal to (one minus) the number of periods in the overall game
between the two firms that I outline below. Secondly, it is the time it takes to ship the in-
25To make sure that my empirical findings hold for trade in intermediates, too, I estimate the location
related baseline specification on a sample excluding final and capital goods. As shown in column (7) of
Online Appendix Table C.12, regionalization is at least as strong for this subset as it is for the baseline
sample. For vertical integration, it is impossible to exclude capital goods, but final goods are unlikely to play
a major role in firm to firm transactions of manufacturing companies – the results are therefore based on
transactions that mostly involve intermediates.
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termediate from the supplier to the buyer factory (also referred to as ‘order lag’). Finally,
it can be interpreted as the distance covered along the way, so that τ is also the conceptual
analogue to distance in the empirical exercises.26
The overall game has τ + 1 stages as depicted in Figure 2. At the preliminary, or ex
ante stage t = 0, all strategic decisions for the supply chain are made and they cannot be
changed afterwards. Every final good producer matches with a supplier, writes supply
contracts, and potentially invests in JIT. When I extend this baseline model to allow for
vertical integration and flexible location choices below, these decisions will also be made
at this stage.27
Technology and contracts
At the next, ex post stage t = 1 (I refer to all stages t ≥ 1 as ex post since they happen
after the strategic decisions have been “locked in”) production of the intermediate takes
place and the associated production costs are
(ηS − dS)2 + w(τ), (3)
where ηS is an i.i.d. supply shock with expectation zero and variance σ2η .
On an abstract level, ηS captures all uncertainties that the upstream supplier faces.
More concretely, imagine that the intermediate input itself is manufactured using an
adjustable mixture of colors and that the supply shock ηS is an unexpected change in
their relative prices. Alternatively, ηS may capture the uncertainties surrounding the
actual production process that may lead to unexpectedly early or late completion of the
intermediate (e.g., machine break-down).
The manager in charge of the supplier’s factory may adapt to the supply shock by
choosing dS to reduce the first term in (3). One may think of this decision as a cost
minimizing choice of the color mixture, or as a quick re-organization of the production
process in the factory. More generally, dS is a catch-all representation of the multitude of
adaptation decisions that can be made. Clearly, if the local manager observes ηS perfectly
and minimizes this expression, they adapt fully to the shock. Doing so may cause exces-
sive costs further down in the supply chain, however, if the adaptation decision conflicts
26I abstract from non-zero production times for the intermediate. While it would be possible to add them,
there is little value in doing so since I do not have any corresponding information in my data set.
27The ex post part of the game is better conceptualized as the stage game of a repeated game, where, after
the supply chain is set up in t = 0, a number of orders are issued and satisfied. I abstract from this substantial
complication, since questions of corporate discounting, supply relationship duration, and optimal dynamic
inventory holding are outside the scope of this paper.
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with downstream conditions, as will become evident below.
The decision dS cannot be written into a contract or observed for enforcement, or
both. Especially if it needs to be taken quickly and ηS poses challenges never encountered
before, non-contractibility is a reasonable approximation to the real world. As in Simon
(1951), Hart and Holmstrom (2010), and Legros and Newman (2013), for example, the
final say on dS in such situations of contractual incompleteness lies with the (manager
of the productive assets, who acts in the interest of the) owner.28 It is precisely in this
sense that the present model embraces the tradition of TCE type models of the boundary
of the firm, since ownership creates authority to make decisions and thus influence the
efficiency of a business relationship.
The second part of (3), w(τ), represents the primary factor costs to produce an inter-
mediate in locality τ, and they will be the reason for offshoring in the extended model
below. I assume that dw(τ)/dτ < 0 and from the perspective of any given firm this is
perhaps stylized, but not too unrealistic in my setting. French companies are too small to
affect factor prices in other countries and, at least anecdotally, face ever lower labor costs
in Eastern European, Arabian, and finally Asian or South American countries.29
The supplier’s objective function – and its incentives when choosing dS – depends on
the contract it signs with the buyer firm. For simplicity, I focus on contracts that reim-
burse the supplier for the primary factor costs incurred, w(τ), and impose a penalty for
any inventory costs that are due to mis-coordination with the downstream firm (specified
below). The strength of this penalty is given by a parameter δ ∈ (0, 1), where the supplier
bears none of the costs it causes with its adaptation decision when δ →+ 0, and all of
them when δ→− 1. I refer to this parameter as “inventory pushing”, because it captures
the degree to which the downstream firm can delegate costs of inventory holding to the
upstream supplier. A stark example of this is the famously lean automobile industry: car
manufacturers/assembler-designers exert substantial market power in their input mar-
kets and push inventories onto their suppliers of seats, chassis, and other components.
Returning to the dynamics of the model, the supplier now sends the finished input to
the downstream firm’s factory, where it arrives in period τ. It is now converted into the
final output using labor.
Downstream demand conditions – not in terms of quantity or quality, but in terms
of horizontal characteristics – are captured by another random variable θt. These may, for
example, a the customer’s preference for dark colors or the particular time slot during
28When ownership and management are in different hands, the manager can always be fired if a residual
decision is taken that conflicts with the owner’s interests. To avoid the numerous complications highlighted
by the vast principle agent literature, I assume that this threat is fully credible and effective.
29Evans and Harrigan (2005) model the international general equilibrium explicitly and obtain the same
pattern endogenously. I abstract from such complications, as they offer few insights regarding the role of JIT.
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which arrival of the intermediate is required. For simplicity, I assume that θt evolves
according to an AR(1) process
θt+1 = ρθt + εt+1,
where θ0 = 0, ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the persistence parameter and εt is an i.i.d. demand shock
with mean zero and variance σ2ε . Demand conditions in period τ are therefore random
and an early signal, θ1, provides some information about what θτ may turn out to be. The
usefulness of such a signal for predicting future demand is higher whenever ρ is closer
to 1 and I refer to this parameter as “demand persistence”.
To the extent that an intermediate does not match the period τ demand conditions
due to imperfect coordination, the buyer firm has to rely on inventories (intermediate or
final) to ensure that all customers are satisfied. To illustrate, suppose that the supplier
decided to incorporate predominantly bright colors into the intermediate, because they
happened to be relatively cheap. If demand conditions are skewed towards dark colors,
the local adaptation decision upstream causes inefficiencies due to mis-coordination, since
customers have to be satisfied with stocked goods. Alternatively, imagine the upstream
supplier’s manager found that it is cost efficient to take some time with a particular stage
in the production process of the intermediate and hence sends it off with a delay. If
the customer specified a particular time slot that is consequently missed, the production
process downstream can only continue when stocked intermediates are used.
The costs of holding inventories to cushion such disruptions are
γ (θτ − dS)2 . (4)
γ > 0 is most naturally interpreted as per unit inventory holding relative to primary
factor costs. This inventory holding behavior is stylized, since the downstream firm has
no economic order quantity problem, no explicit stock-out avoidance motives, or any
dynamic optimization problem. While I abstract from these and other major real life
challenges for manufacturers, my model remains tractable and delivers important insights
for supply chains.30
It would be straightforward to introduce a non-contractible adaptation decision dB for
the downstream buyer firm at time τ, too. Inventories would cover both the loss due
to mis-coordination between dS and dB, and the one due to imperfect local adaptation
30Indeed, even simple inventory models have no closed form solution and need to be simulated. This
unfortunate fact is illustrated for stock-out avoidance models by Kahn (1987) and for the Economic Order
Quantity model with disruptions in Choi (2014). Generally, an S,s type policy is optimal in many dynamic
inventory holding settings – but the closed form expressions for S and s are elusive and approximating them
is a flourishing business, at least since Federgruen and Zipkin (1984). For prominent examples of s,S type
inventory model in economics, see Khan and Thomas (2007) or Alessandria et al. (2010).
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between dB and θτ. Such a generalization would render the key mechanism fully explicit,
but adds further complexity without providing any deeper additional insights. I therefore
proceed with the simpler version and θτ can be interpreted as the delivery target for the
supplier, i.e., with all downstream adaptations already made.
Finally, the buyer converts a unit of the intermediate into ϕ units of output. The
productivity parameter ϕ is heterogeneous across downstream firms and, for simplicity,
follows a Pareto distribution with shape parameter k ≥ 1 and lower bound 1. Moreover,
production downstream requires machines and overhead labor in the form of managers,
accountants, and other staff. These costs are lumped into a single fixed cost parameter f ,
denoted in terms of labor (whose price is normalized to one).
JIT and information
At the ex ante stage t = 0, the downstream firm has an opportunity to devote an
amount of resources to adopt JIT. Following Bustos (2011), I model these as a propor-
tional increase in fixed costs, so that total fixed costs for a stand-alone downstream firm
become λJ IT f with λJ IT > 1. JIT requires additional overhead in the form of, for example,
dedicated supply chain managers capable of running a complex and highly connected
supply network, maintenance of common IT structures or interfaces, and joint research
and development with the goal of interlocked products and processes.
In a ‘traditional’ supply chain, raw materials and intermediates are “pushed” through
the different stages of the value chain and whenever a stage needs inputs, it takes them
off its supplier’s shelves – a private customer quite literally does so in a supermarket.
No heed is, or can be, paid to the conditions in the downstream market and inventory
holding costs are high. By contrast, in a JIT system the buyer firm shares information
about downstream demand conditions in period t = 1 (in other words, in real-time), so
that the supplier is in a better position to finish the right intermediate at the right time
– hence the very term “Just-in-Time”. Mis-coordination inventories, i.e., the figurative
shelf-space, can be reduced substantially. To put the same point differently, JIT causes
materials and intermediates to be “pulled” through the value chain.
For a “push” approach to supply chain management, I assume that the information set
of the supplier is I¬J ITS = {ηS}, i.e., it observes its local shock perfectly, but nothing else.
The buyer firm’s manager observes the final demand conditions at any point in time,
so that I¬J ITB = {θt}t≤τ. To build intuition, the information friction across firms could
be due to a lack of a good information transmission system or due to organizational
inefficiencies – the manager in charge of plant B is not instructed to channel demand
information upstream, for example. Especially in a global supply network setting, it is
quite plausible that a manager with a ‘traditional mind-set’ would not relay information
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upstream or that managerial overload introduces severe frictions into this process.
By contrast, in a JIT system, the information sets are
I J ITS = {ηS, θ1}, I
J IT
B = {θt}t≤τ,
i.e., the upstream firms’ manager receives a signal θ1, which they can take into account
when they make their adaptation decisions.31
Solution
I solve the model via backward induction. At stage t = τ, the first order condition for







where the mode of supply chain management is M = ¬J IT, J IT and the asterisk indicates
optimal choices. c∗(M) is shorthand for the total procurement costs of one unit of the
intermediate, which includes the price of the intermediate and inventory holding costs.





+ (ηS − dS)2 + w(τ).
The first term captures the upstream firm’s share in expected mis-coordination inventory
holding costs and the second term captures adaptation to the supply shock. Minimizing
production costs is subject to a trade-off between coordinated and local adaptation, with
the weights given by the relative costs of inventory holding and the degree to which the
buyer can oblige the supplier to share in the costs of mis-coordination.
















If inventories were costless (γ = 0) or if the supply contract provided no incentives for
coordinated adaptation (δ →+ 0), the supplier would fully adapt to its local shock. Since
neither of these conditions is satisfied by assumption, the supplier strikes an individually
optimal balance and adapts both to the technology shock and its conditional expectation





31I abstract from cheap talk considerations about θ, since they do not contribute any additional relevant
insights. Cheap talk is, however, a main theme in the related work by Alonso et al. (2015).
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Note that from the perspective of the overall supply chain (segment), the supplier’s
incentives to adapt in a coordinated way are too weak since γδ < γ. In other words,
an outsourcing contract between two independent firms implies a supply chain externality.
This will become even clearer below when I allow the two firms to merge and align
incentives along the supply chain.
In a ‘traditional’ system, where the upstream firm just pushes its intermediate down-
stream, it can only take changes in the local upstream conditions into account, since









= ρτθ1, and the supplier is in a position to coordinate its adaptation decision
with what happens downstream in the supply chain.
To build intuition for the role of information sharing, suppose that ρ = 0, which
implies that no signal earlier than in period t = τ has any predictive power for the
relevant demand shock θτ. Regardless of whether there was an ex ante investment in JIT
technology or not, the supplier has a constant conditional expectation E[θτ|IMS ] = 0. Only
if ρ > 0 – which I assume throughout – is there any value to JIT: the supplier’s additional
information can be used to coordinate better with the downstream part of the supply
chain, so that mis-coordination inventories can be cut and the transaction becomes more
efficient.
For the downstream firm, the overall expected procurement costs incurred with a
certain supply chain structure, c∗(M), are given by the unconditional, i.e., period t = 0,
expectation of its share in inventory holding costs plus the price of the intermediate
(which itself is equal to inventory holding costs upstream and primary factor costs):



























The first term in the curly brackets, γ(1 − ρτ)/(1 − ρ), corresponds to the inventory
holdings costs due to the inevitable order lag τ. The second term in the bracket, which
is present only in a JIT supply chain, captures the inventory reduction from information
exchange. It falls in τ, since the demand signal becomes increasingly obsolete as the
intermediate spends more time in transit. Moreover, the JIT inventory reduction increases
in δ, because the supplier’s incentives are better aligned with the buyer’s interests, i.e.,
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when the supply chain externality is less severe. Finally, JIT is particularly valuable if
inventories are costly (γ high).
The third term in c(M)∗ captures two inefficiencies that arise because the upstream
supplier neither adapts perfectly to the local conditions, nor in a coordinated way with the
rest of the supply chain. First, coordinating with downstream demand conditions creates
productive inefficiencies upstream in the form of a dampened response to the ηS shock.
The implied additional costs increase in σ2η . Secondly, partial adaptation to downstream
demand conditions generates additional inventories, which have to be larger when mis-
coordination is worse, i.e, when σ2η is high or when δ is low.
On the ex ante stage, downstream firms decide on whether to produce in the first
place and on whether they want to operate with ‘traditional’ supply chain management
or under a JIT regime. Their profits take the general form
π(M) = (α− 1)−1B [c∗(M)]1−α ϕα−1 − λM f ,
where λ¬J IT = 1 < λJ IT.
Since c∗(¬J IT) > c∗(J IT) and λJ IT > 1, the industry equilibrium features a standard
selection pattern. Due to the fixed costs component f there is a mass of very unproductive
downstream firms (low ϕ) who do not enter into production since they would not be
efficient enough to make positive profits. The cut-off productivity with which a non-JIT
buyer would break even is given by
ϕ¬J IT ≡ c(¬J IT)∗B
1
1−α (α− 1) 1α−1 f 1α−1 .
Analogously, there is a cut-off defined by the productivity of firms that are indifferent
between producing with and without JIT supply chain management:
ϕJ IT ≡ c(J IT)∗B
1
1−α (α− 1) 1α−1 (λJ IT f )
1
α−1 .
Note that nothing so far prevents that ϕ¬J IT > ϕJ IT, in which case all active producers
do so under JIT. In what follows, I will posit that the fixed costs of JIT are large enough so
that some firms cannot afford the modern paradigm. This assumption is fully consistent
with the empirical fact documented above in Subsection 2.1 that participants in JIT supply
chains are larger and more productive than their ‘traditional’ counterparts.
3.2 Endogenous Location Choice and Vertical Integration
Additional assumptions
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The buyer is now free to pick an optimal location τ on the ex ante stage t = 0. For
simplicity, I abstract from fixed costs of upstream market access and there are no ad-
ditional trade costs. Although both types of frictions can be introduced without much
effort, doing so creates no relevant additional insights regarding the interaction between
supply chain management and location choice.
Furthermore, the two companies are now allowed to merge. Under non-integration/
outsourcing (indexed NI), where the upstream and downstream parties are fully inde-
pendent, the manager of the supplier makes decision dS to maximize their local profits
– just as described in the baseline model above. By contrast, under vertical integration
(indexed VI), where the two factories are owned by a single, potentially multinational en-
tity, the decision lies in the hands of a “supply chain supervisor”. This person naturally
acts in the interest of the overall segment of the supply chain, i.e, the whole company.
Similar to Antràs and Helpman (2004), employing this supply chain manager constitutes
a fixed cost λVI f > 1.32
The second difference between arm’s length trading and intrafirm procurement is the
contractual set-up. Since the overall efficiency of the input transaction does not depend
on how costs and rents are distributed within the integrated firm, I will not make any
assumptions about the employment contracts that govern the flow of funds.
Importantly, the supply chain supervisor in a vertically integrated setting uses the
same information when making the adaptation decision dS at stage t = 1 as do the
individual managers of the separate firms in an outsourcing relationship. To capture this
point I assume that the information sets are
I t=1,¬J ITVI = {ηS}, I
t=τ,¬J IT
VI = {θτ},
when the supply relationship is managed in a ‘traditional’ way, while they are
I t=1,J ITVI = {ηS, θ1}, I
t=τ,J IT
VI = {θτ}
for JIT supply chains.
This stark assumption – that information exchange works equally well within and
across companies – ensures that JIT and vertical integration are two entirely different or-
ganizational margins, where the former affects only the flow of information and the latter
only changes the incentive or authority structure. This assumption is also much stronger
32These fixed costs can be interpreted more broadly as “bureaucracy costs” in the spirit of TCE type
models (Tadelis and Williamson, 2012). Outsourcing certainly involves overhead expenditures, too, but these
are typically smaller than under vertical integration. Indeed, the very act of outsourcing is often described
as ‘turning fixed into variable costs’. In this model, λVI > 1 can thus be interpreted as the difference between
the fixed costs of vertical integration and those of outsourcing.
32
than required to arrive at the main insights in this model. As long as vertical integration
does not imply perfect information, the qualitative implications are unchanged. I rely
on the more stylized assumption to carve out the workings of the mechanisms as clearly
as possible. Moreover, this setting may not be too far removed from many real world
contexts, where managerial overload makes it difficult for the supply chain supervisor
to ensure all information is relayed to all suppliers, especially in an international and
complex production network.
Solution
I follow the same backward induction strategy as for the baseline model. There are
now four broad branches in the game tree, spanned by the downstream firm’s t = 0
decisions to vertically integrate with the supplier and to engage in JIT supply chain man-
agement. In addition, each branch has several leaves due to the supplier location decision.
The optimal price the downstream firm charges its customers is






where the only difference to expression (5) is that the procurement costs are indexed by
the organizational mode Int = VI, NI and the supplier location τ.
Focusing on the vertical integration branch of the game, the supply chain supervisor
takes all decisions with the goal of minimizing overall procurement costs, i.e., they solve
mindS w(τ) + (ηS − dS)
2 + γ E
[
(θτ − dS)2|I t=1,MVI
]
,












The analogous expression under non-integration, (6), differs from this choice in an im-
portant way. The adaptation decision at the supplier plant is now less biased towards
the local shock ηS, since the supply chain supervisor puts more weight on coordinated
adaptation. Intuitively, vertical integration provides the right incentives for the supplier
plant to contribute to the success of the transaction and the supply chain externality is
fully internalized.
Overall procurement costs under vertical integration amount to
33













There are two crucial differences compared to outsourcing (cf. equation (7)). The first is
that the gain from JIT is larger, since the supplier plant makes efficient use of the demand
information: it puts inventory minimizing weight on coordinated adaptation, which can
be seen in the larger coefficient on ρ2(τ−1). From a conceptual point of view, there is a
complementarity in the two organizational decisions, since introducing JIT leads to larger
cost savings when the two plants are integrated, and vice versa.
The second difference is that the supplier resolves the trade-off between local and
coordinated adaptation more on the side of the latter. As a consequence and even though
the supply chain manager puts less weight on local adaptation, thereby compromising
productive efficiency upstream, inventories are lower and procurement costs are reduced
(this gain is reflected in the smaller coefficient on σ2η ).
On the ex ante stage t = 0, two additional choices have to be made now compared to
the baseline model: where to match with a supplier and whether it should be a stand-




π(τ, Int, M) = (α− 1)−1B c(τ, Int, M)1−α ϕα−1 − λIntλM f , (11)
where λNI = 1.
Solving this program with respect to τ leads to the first proposition, which provides
the conceptual groundwork for the stylized fact presented in Subsection 2.2: French firms,
when they operate a JIT supply chain, are more likely to have trading relationships with
closer partner countries, and trade relatively more with them.33
Proposition 1 Under mild conditions on w(τ), JIT supply chains are more spatially concentrated
than ‘traditional’ ones along both the extensive and intensive margins of trade.
Proof. See Online Appendix Section B.1.
Intuitively, when a ‘traditional’ downstream buyer makes its supplier location choice,
it trades off inventory costs due to the order lag against primary factor costs. A remote
33While locations are discrete in this model to make for a simple interpretation of stages in the game, I
nevertheless treat τ as continuous to abstract from mathematical complications and thus allow for a clear
exposition of the main trade-offs involved.
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supplier has an additional disadvantage for JIT firms, however: the coordination advan-
tage created by sharing an early signal of demand conditions is smaller, because lengthy
shipping times reduce the forecasting value of θ1. As a result, JIT firms are willing to
source from more expensive localities to make better use of their investment in JIT supply
chain management (extensive margin).
Defining the intensive margin of trade appropriately in the model, I can show that
trade volumes are skewed towards partners nearby, too (intensive margin). To build intu-
ition, procurement costs are lower due to the complementarity between JIT and proximity,
which implies that a JIT firm charges its downstream consumers lower final output prices,
attracts more demand, and hence orders a larger quantity from its supplier.34
Finally, firms sort into different ownership and supply chain management configura-
tions via cut-off rules in productivity, trading off fixed against variable costs:




1−α (λIntλM f )
1
α−1 . (12)
While several different sorting patterns into the four tuples of ownership and manage-
ment are possible, there are only two relevant cases I have to analyze. Returning to the
sample of outsourced and integrated supply relationships used in Subsection 2.3, any
such combination of a downstream firm and an upstream industry can be treated as a
supply relationship with a (Int, M) configuration as in this conceptual model. In 2006,
out of 214 NAF downstream industries with both JIT and non-JIT firms, 211 exhibit full
heterogeneity: all four possible configurations of ownership and management occur si-
multaneously.35 I can therefore restrict my analysis to the parameter space that yields
such equilibrium outcomes at the industry level.
Proposition 2 JIT supply chains are more vertically integrated than their ‘traditional’ counter-
parts.
Proof. See Online Appendix Section B.3.
34In Online Appendix B.1 I show that there is also a price effect that shapes the intensive margin. JIT
reduces mis-coordination inventories, which lowers the price of the intermediate, too. Under realistic as-
sumptions about the downstream demand elasticity, however, the quantity effect dominates this price effect.
35In the three remaining industries there are some JIT firms that report no vertical integration. Two of them
are recycling industries, while the remaining one is production of “other non-metallic mineral products” –
overall they account for 47 firms out of a total of 3,612. Another point to note is that in 61 industries no JIT
production is reported. These do not, however, contribute to my estimates due to downstream industry fixed
effects. The same is true for the 20 industries that feature only JIT firms. I treat all the aforementioned in-
dustries as an insignificant exception to the rule and refrain from adding a conditionality to the propositions
that follow.
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The intuition for this result, which provides a potential rationale for the stylized fact
presented in Section 2.3, rests on the complementarity between JIT and vertical inte-
gration.36 While the increase in fixed costs of in-house production are proportionally
the same under JIT and ‘traditional’ supply chain management, the additional benefit is
greater under JIT due to the complementarity in inventory holding. Given the well be-
haved Pareto distribution of core productivities ϕ, vertical integration is more prevalent
in JIT supply chains.37
4 Testing Further Predictions
In this section I derive additional predictions based on comparative statics with respect
to the key parameters in the model and confront them with the data. I focus on inventory
holding costs, demand persistence, and scope for inventory pushing, since they reflect
key aspects in the theoretical framework presented. All three parameters are assumed to
vary primarily at the industry level, since assignment to industries is done on the basis
of common output characteristics and it seems plausible that these three parameters are
related to features of the production technology employed. I study how these characteris-
tics re-enforce or weaken the positive correlations between JIT supply chain management,
spatial concentration, and vertical integration.
The exercise in this section serves three purposes. First, successfully testing these
further predictions lends additional credibility to the main ideas captured by my the-
oretical framework. Secondly, I uncover novel features of the environment that shape
(international) firm boundaries and location choices in supply chains via their effects on
management choice JIT vs. non-JIT. Thirdly, by means of these exercises I provide direct
input for the discussion of policy implications in Section 5.
4.1 Testable Implications
Proposition 3 Ceteris paribus, in industries with
1. high inventory carrying costs (γ ↑)
2. high demand persistence (ρ ↑)
36One may be tempted to ascribe a role to the fixed costs involved in the different set-ups. As Online Ap-
pendix B.3 shows, however, they are only relevant for the taxonomy of different sorting patterns. Proposition
2 holds irrespective of the values of λJ IT and λVI .
37Since there is no free entry, it can be shown that the finding is overturned if the frequency distribution
of productivities is highly irregular and features significant mass in certain intervals. While a theoretical
possibility, the Pareto is a good approximation to the right tail of the productivity distribution – arguably the
relevant part for my setting – in most industries and most countries (see, for the U.S. and France, respectively,
Axtell, 2001; Eaton et al., 2011).
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3. a lot of scope for inventory pushing (δ ↑)
JIT supply chains are
• particularly concentrated spatially, and
• more vertically integrated in cases 1 + 2, but less so in case 3.
Proof. See section B.4 in the Online Appendix.
First, JIT supply chain management, which reduces the level of inventory holding, has
a high return when stocks are costly. Reducing its return by choosing a remote supplier
or providing weak incentives to coordinate by outsourcing are therefore particularly bad
ideas. Consequently, in industries where γ is high, JIT firms are predicted to choose even
closer suppliers and to rely more intensively on in-house production.
Secondly, in a downstream industry with very low demand persistence, any real-time
signal sent under JIT has little value for coordination to begin with, so that spending
additional resources on vertical integration to complement this system is unattractive –
the complementarity will be weak. The impact of demand persistence on spatial patterns
in JIT supply chains is non-monotonic. On the one hand, when ρ is high, any downstream
signal is particularly useful for prediction, so that the return from complementing JIT
with spatially agglomerated production is high. On the other hand, the environment is
inherently less uncertain and coordination is easier. The return to JIT – and to reinforcing
it by choosing proximate trade partners – is therefore smaller. While the latter effect may
be a consideration for adjacent trade partners, even with short order lags, it has little
empirical relevance (see Online Appendix B.4).38
The scope for inventory pushing has different effects on the two complementarities.
If contracts can induce the upstream supplier to coordinate well, they are a substitute for
vertical integration. In such an environment, the correlation between JIT and in-house
production is weaker. By contrast, the same incentivizing power of inventory pushing
strengthens the positive JIT – proximity correlation for trade between unrelated parties:
if the supplier puts substantial weight on coordinated adaptation, any demand signal is
used efficiently, a JIT system is particularly beneficial, and it pays run it with a supplier
nearby.39
38For τ → 1, ρ must be larger than ≈ 0.6 for its effect to switch sign, as shown in Online Appendix B.4.
Slightly anticipating the empirical analysis below, my industry level proxy for demand persistence is equal
to .53 at the 75th percentile. Consequently, it is not surprising that an unreported test for a non-monotonicity
in the effect of demand persistence on the correlation between JIT and proximity fails.
39Intrafirm trade is not affected by differences in δ. Since arm’s length trade accounts for about two thirds
of French international trade, however, there is hope of empirical support even if the two types of trade are
not distinguishable in my customs data
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4.2 Empirical Strategy and Results
To proxy for the inventory cost parameter γ, I rely on the assumption that the purchase
value of an intermediate is a key determinant of how costly it is to hold stocks. While
many factors may be relevant, there is little doubt that it is significantly more expensive
to keep valuable produce on the shelf. The risk of obsolescence, the opportunity cost of
tied up working capital, and the substantial expenditure on security all play important
roles.
For regressions where the unit of observation is a particular trade flow at the 8 digit
CN level, I measure a good’s value as the median unit value within every 8 digit CN
product category based on French customs data from 1996, i.e., pre-sample. For the
vertical integration regressions, where variation is at the upstream-downstream industry
level, I rely on direct requirements from the 2002 U.S. benchmark IO table. Since these IO
coefficients capture the relative value of different upstream inputs, they are useful proxies
for γ. Summary statistics for both variables can be found in Online Appendix Table C.3
and all details of how I construct these and all other variables are provided in Online
Appendix A.1.
Following the model’s assumptions closely, I measure industry level demand persis-
tence ρi by the AR(1) coefficient estimated on annual firm sales. The summary statistics
in Panel B of Online Appendix Table C.3 show that a unit shock to sales has a half-life
of about −ln(2)/ln(0.40) ≈ 9 months for the average 4 digit NAF industry and the in-
terquartile range is about 9 months, too. These numbers are substantial and there is
considerable variation across industries.
To arrive at a proxy for “inventory pushing”, i.e. the capacity for downstream firms
to “force” their upstream suppliers to share in the costs of inventory holding, I divide
average inventories (normalized by sales) in the upstream industry by the same variable
for the downstream industry.40 The signal in this variable captures the burden borne by
the upstream firms relative to the burden borne by the downstream ones. As Panel B
of Online Appendix Table C.3 illustrates, pairwise relative inventory holdings tend to be
roughly balanced between the upstream and the downstream sector for the median input
supply relationship, with a tendency towards upstream inventory holding on average.
For distance related regressions, where I have no information about inventory holding
abroad, I create a weighted average measure for every downstream industry.
I interact the main regressors from the baseline specifications related to location, (1),
40Information about contractual provisions is very hard to come by and typically only available in industry
studies. At the same time, market power – however measured – is a poor proxy, since it affects prices,
depends on and affects other aspects of contracting, and influences integration decisions directly. The most
appealing alternative is therefore to use observed inventories.
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and vertical integration, (2), with above-median indicators based on the distributions of
the proxies just described. Since I do not have information about foreign trade partners,
I estimate the location related regressions on a sample based on imports only.41
Figure 3 illustrates the intensive margin results for the first part of Proposition 3 re-
lating to the spatial structure of JIT supply chains in a series of maps.42 The left hand
sub-figure in each panel shows the coefficients from the baseline specification (1) when
the respective characteristic is above the median of the relevant distribution, while on the
right hand, the characteristic is below.
The first and second prediction of Proposition 3 is supported strongly by the data,
see panels a) and b): while the maps for high characteristics on the left show substantial
spatial concentration, the ones on the right show little or no differences across countries.
By contrast, there is little heterogeneity when it comes to inventory pushing. One expla-
nation for this null finding is measurement error: since no information about upstream
inventory holding is available to me, my proxy for δ may be noisy.
Next, I examine the industry patterns of vertical integration and illustrate the results in
Figure 4, where the dark blue bars depict the coefficient estimates on JIT from the baseline
regression (2) when the characteristic depicted below the x-axis is high (above median in
the relevant distribution), while the light green ones relate to the characteristic being low.
All details for the underlying regressions are reported in Online Appendix Table C.9 and
tests for significance of the differences are shown in Online Appendix Table C.10.
All three predictions regarding vertical integration are strongly supported by the data
both for overall and multinational activity. First, JIT firms produce intermediates ‘in-
house’ whenever stocking them is particularly costly, either because of the large quantity
or high unit price transacted.43 Secondly, when the downstream industry’s demand is
more persistent, JIT is more likely to be combined with vertical integration. Finally, for
both overall and foreign vertical integration, pushing inventories onto upstream suppliers
proves to be an important substitute to direct control via ownership in the data.
I present two sets of important robustness checks regarding industry heterogeneity in
Online Appendix A.4. First, several alternative proxies for inventory holding costs gener-
ate very similar insights for both the spatial patterns and for vertical integration. Perhaps
most reassuringly, industries that trade many different products show stronger comple-
mentarities between JIT and proximity or vertical integration. This pattern is consistent
41In column (8) of Online Appendix Table C.12, I re-estimate the baseline specification (1) on a sample of
import trade flows and the coefficients are very similar to the overall sample.
42The underlying estimates are reported in Online Appendix Table C.7 and tests for significant differences
between high and low charactistics are reported in Online Appendix Table C.8.
43One may be concerned that the value transacted in a relationship drives ownership decisions as in
Legros and Newman (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2016). It is not obvious, however, how their mechanism causes
differences in organizational structure between JIT supply chains and ‘traditional’ ones.
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with the idea that multi-product firms, which offer a plethora of varieties and source
many different intermediates to manufacture them, have to carry stocks individually for
each intermediate and variety, which is costly. Such complex supply chains therefore
benefit more from a spatially concentrated and vertically integrated JIT regime.
In the second set of robustness checks, I rule out alternative mechanisms that could
explain the heterogeneity in vertical integration, for example related to TCE or PRT ideas
regarding the boundary of the firm. The conclusion from this exercise is that even in the
most demanding setting, the main insights presented in Figure 4 are robust, especially
for multinational activity.
5 Policy Implications for Brexit and COVID-19
In this section I employ the conceptual framework and the empirical findings to discuss
the long-run consequences of Brexit and COVID-19 for the structure of global supply
chains. I focus on both the prevalence of JIT manufacturing and the organizational mar-
gins examined in this paper, location and ownership choices. Treating each crisis in turn,
I first outline the way I conceptualize the fundamental changes to firms’ business envi-
ronments that have occurred and then discuss both how supply chains are predicted to
reorganize and which industries/industry pairs would be most heavily affected.
Brexit
Especially during the discussions and debates in the run-up to Brexit, many man-
ufacturers emphasized their worries about non-tariff barriers in the form of additional
documentation required to meet diverging regulations in the UK and Europe as well as
about associated checks being intensified at the border. Such changes would introduce
friction into their highly coordinated JIT supply chains and cause substantial productivity
losses. In my framework, one can conceptualize such delays as an increase in shipping
time for any given location τ, so that distance becomes X ∗ τ with X > 1.
Unsurprisingly, Brexit increases inventory costs in any organizational set-up, but, con-
sistent with anecdotal evidence, JIT firms are doubly hit: in addition to holding higher
base inventories for any trade relationship, their advantage of “make-to-order” produc-
tion decreases. As a consequence, the share of firms who manage their supply relation-
ship in a JIT fashion declines.
While all firms skew their supply chains more towards local trade partners as a result
of longer waiting times at the border – i.e., due to higher trade costs – the reaction in JIT
networks will be weaker: some relationships reduce their JIT intensity and thus lose some
of their distance sensitivity, while those that retain their JITness focus less on proximate
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partners since the inventory cost savings of doing so are reduced. In sum, while JIT sup-
ply chains are particularly affected by Brexit, their reorganization alleviates the tendency
for UK trade with remote partner countries to fall. Of course, this comes at the price of
lower productive efficiency and thus higher prices for UK consumers.
The UK is one of the leading host and origin countries for FDI and multinational
production in the world. My conceptual framework suggests one reason for why this
position may be under threat in manufacturing. As the JIT intensity of UK and Euro-
pean production falls due to frictions at the border, the coordination motive for vertical
integration highlighted in this paper ceases to exist for many companies. Some firms
are expected to sell their stakes in foreign subsidiaries and hence FDI stocks are reduced
everywhere in Europe.
The effects on international trade and on multinational production will be vastly het-
erogeneous across industries and industry pairs according to the additional empirical
findings in Section 4. High inventory carrying costs in “other transport equipment”(ISIC
Rev. 3 code 35), “motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers” (34), or “office machinery
and computers” (30) will render Brexit delays particularly problematic for JIT and lead
to a much attenuated spatial concentration effect as outlined above (see Online Appendix
Table C.11). At the same time, trade with remote countries will fall more substantially
in “wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur” (18) or “leather products” (19), due to
the loss of JIT intensity. By extension, multinational activity is expected to fall strongly
in the former, and perhaps very little in the latter industries. Similar arguments can be
made along the other two margins highlighted by the model; demand persistence and
inventory pushing.
COVID-19
The emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 virus can be thought of as a shock to (perceived)
uncertainty, either because COVID-19 might become a normal, and perhaps seasonal ill-
ness with recurring outbreaks (as of the time of writing), or because the risk of pandemics
has become more salient after having been underestimated. In my conceptual framework,
depending on the position of an industry in the value chain, the increase in uncertainty
takes the form of a larger variance of the upstream shock ηS or of the downstream shock
εt (but typically both to different degrees).44
The main insight afforded by the theoretical model is that all supply chains, irre-
44The COVID-19 crisis had severe short run consequences due to a complete lock-down of many economic
activities in virtually all countries. While it is important to understand how JIT supply chains contributed to
the transmission and amplification of these shocks, the conceptual framework in this paper is not well suited
to address such questions.
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spective of their organizational set-up, experience an increase in inventory holding and
therefore in procurement costs. Importantly, however, this negative shock is less severe
for supply chains with superior coordination capabilities, i.e., for all production networks
inside (international) business groups and even more so for those operating a JIT sys-
tem in addition. Consequently, both multinational production and JIT supply chains are
predicted to become more prevalent.
These effects have direct implications for international trade, which is expected to
see an increase in spatial concentration. This tendency towards regionalization would,
however, be entirely unrelated to the recent wave of renewed protectionism and it is
important to make a clear distinction between these two forces pushing a reorganization
of GVCs. Moreover, spatial concentration may not take the form of “re-shoring”, i.e.,
shifting previously off-shored production stages from countries like China back to Europe
or North America. Local JIT supply networks in China and South-East Asia are also
expected to deal very efficiently with increased uncertainty. It is therefore more likely that
international commerce will move back towards trade in final goods or at least towards
more complex intermediate parts and components closer to the end-product.
As in the case of Brexit, these patterns are, however, expected to be stronger in some,
and weaker in other industries in line with the heterogeneities described in Section 4.
Moreover, the conceptual framework implies similar reactions to any other increase in
uncertainty, be it due to a new virus, climate change, or political instability.
6 Conclusion
JIT supply chains are prevalent and constitute an important margin in the organization
of economic activity. Much of their significance is driven by the fact that it is the larger
and more productive companies that rely on them. Compared to their more ‘traditional’
counterparts, JIT supply networks are also spatially more concentrated and more ver-
tically integrated. To give a structural interpretation to these patterns in the data, this
paper proposes a stylized conceptual framework. It illustrates that additional down-
stream information that is disseminated throughout the supply network in a JIT regime
is particularly valuable for coordination if all parties have strong incentives to react to it
in the right way, i.e., if they belong to the same firm, and when order lags are short due
to proximity. As a consequence, all three organizational margins complement each other.
To lend further credibility to the framework, I show that additional predictions regarding
how these complementarities vary in strength with features of the (market) environment
receive significant empirical support. Finally, the model and my empirical findings pro-
vide important inputs for policy. For example, the increase in uncertainty following the
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COVID-19 crisis is likely to make regional JIT supply chains – controlled by large multi-
nationals – relatively more common as they have superior abilities for coordinated, and
therefore efficient adaptation.
Not least by showing the prevalence and economic importance of JIT supply chains,
this paper encourages several lines of further research at the intersection of supply chain
management and international trade in general. First, how will the ICT revolution change
the patterns of global production? The conceptual mechanism I propose may contribute
to understanding the impact of modern digital technologies – like high performance 5G
networks or the Internet of Things – which transform how information is shared among
different tasks in value chains. Not only are JIT supply chains likely to benefit from such
innovations and will be more widely adopted; this paper suggests that, perhaps contrary
to common perception, global supply networks may become more concentrated in terms
of space and ownership due to the complementarities highlighted (for a similar point, see
Venables, 2001). Secondly, how are shocks transmitted across countries and industries?
Is there amplification through supply networks? JIT supply chain management may play
a crucial role for these and related questions. Altomonte et al. (2013), for example, doc-
ument that the Great Trade Collapse was much more rapid for intrafirm trade than for
trade between unrelated parties. This finding is fully consistent with the view that highly
coordinated supply chains with fluid information sharing, low inventories, and common
ownership imply agile response patterns. Testing and elaborating on this and similar
ideas related to JIT is a promising way forward to understand resilience and shock prop-
agation in a globalized world economy – especially in times of increased uncertainty both
in the physical realm, owing to climate change and new diseases, and in the policy realm
owing to an increasingly divided society and populism.
Frank Pisch is affiliated with the University of St. Gallen, SIAW, and CEP.
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Figure 1: Maps Of Estimates
(a) Extensive Margin
(b) Intensive Margin
Figures depict point estimates from columns (3) and (6) of Online Appendix Table C.5, which are based on
specification (1). The Republic of Kosovo was not officially recognized before 2008 and is treated as part of
the Republic of Serbia in this paper.
Figure 2: Timeline













sell output, pay supplier
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Figures depict estimates from columns (1)-(3) of Online Appendix Table C.7. Coefficients of “above median”
on the left of each panel, “below median” on the right. The Republic of Kosovo was not officially recognized
before 2008 and is treated as part of the Republic of Serbia in this paper.
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Figure 4: Heterogeneity (Incl. 95% Confidence Intervals)
(a) all integration
(b) foreign integration
Figures depict point estimates as bars and standard errors as handle bars from columns (1)-(3) in Online
Appendix Table C.9. “above median” coefficients in blue, “below median” in green.
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